



# BINARY EDWARDS CURVES FOR INTRINSICALLY SECURE ECC IMPLEMENTATION FOR THE IOT

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
Performances

- **Goal : build an elliptic curves based system for a 32-bit RISC V architecture**
- **RISC V :**
  - Open source instruction set architecture (University of California)
    - 32 bits architecture
  - Modular architecture with extended instructions
    - Specific instructions available for future optimizations
  - No carry flag
- **ECC for IoT :**
  - FIPS 186-4 (NIST)
    - Old : upgrades available on the arithmetic and security
  - Edwards curve : Ed25519
    - Prime field : carry propagation

- **NIST standards**
  - Define a set of elliptic curves over prime and binary fields
  - Define a digital signature based on ECC : ECDSA
  - Define a key exchange method on ECC : ECDH
- **Other standardizations :**
  - Brainpool curves
  - Edwards curves (Ed25519)
- **ECC systems are based on the difficulty of the Discrete Logarithm Problem on the group of a elliptic curve.**
  - Let  $G$  and  $P$  points of the group of the elliptic curve such as  $P = kG$ . It is hard to find  $k$  from  $G$  and  $P$ .
  - Usually  $P$  is called public key,  $k$  is called private key and  $G$  is called the generator of the group.


# HOW TO GENERATE NEW ELLIPTIC CURVES ?

Cryptographic Protocols : ECDSA, ECDH...



# HOW TO GENERATE NEW ELLIPTIC CURVES ?

Cryptographic Protocols : ECDSA, ECDH...



- **NIST recommendations :**
  - Trinomials :  $p(x) = x^m + x^a + 1, m > a > 0$
  - Pentanomials :  $p(x) = x^m + x^a + x^b + x^c + 1, m > a > b > c > 0$
  - With small  $a, b$  and  $c$
  
- **Scott's polynomials**
  - Lucky trinomials :  $m - a \equiv 0 [w]$
  - Lucky pentanomials :  $m - a \equiv 0[w], m - b \equiv 0[w]$  and  $m - c \equiv 0[w]$
  - $w$  is the width of the targeted architecture (32 bits, 64 bits...)
  
- **Selection of Scott's polynomials of degree from 256 to 512 to address security level from 128 to 256 bits**
  
- **Security requirements :  $m$  shall be prime to avoid GHS attack**


# NEW ELLIPTIC CURVES

Secu.	Name	Modulus	Parameter d	Generator
112	BEC223	$x^{223} + x^{159} + 1$		
128	BEC257	$x^{257} + x^{65} + 1$		
156	BEC313	$x^{313} + x^{121} + 1$		
215	BEC431	$x^{431} + x^{303} + x^{239} + x^{111} + 1$		
239	BEC479	$x^{479} + x^{255} + 1$		
243	BEC487	$x^{487} + x^{295} + x^{167} + x^{39} + 1$		
260	BEC521	$x^{521} + x^{489} + 1$		
284	BEC569	$x^{569} + x^{441} + x^{313} + x^{121} + 1$		




- **Weierstrass curves**

- Prime fields :  $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$
- Binary fields :  $y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + b$
- Neutral element : Infinite point



- **Edwards curves**

- Prime fields :  $x^2 + y^2 = 1 + dx^2y^2$
- Neutral element :  $(1, 0)$
- Complete group law



# BINARY EDWARDS CURVES (BEC)

- **Definition :**

- Let  $d$  a element of  $GF(2^m)$  with a trace different from 0, the BEC of parameter  $d$  is given by :

$$d(x + y + x^2 + y^2) = xy + xy(x + y)x^2y^2$$

- **Properties :**

- Neutral element :  $(0, 0)$
- $\forall P \in E(GF(2^m)), P = (x, y) \rightarrow -P = (y, x)$
- $P + (1, 1) = (x, y) + (1, 1) = (x + 1, y + 1)$
- $d(X + Y)Z^3 + d(X^2 + Y^2)Z^2 = XYZ^2 + XY(X + Y) + X^2Y^2$
- Complete group law
- Birational equivalent to a Weierstrass curve :

$$v^2 + uv = u^3 + (d^2 + d)u^2 + d^8$$

- **w-differential coordinate :**
  - Let  $P = (x, y) \rightarrow w(P) = x + y$
  - We can compute  $w(2P)$  and  $w(P + Q)$  with  $w(P), w(Q)$  and  $w(P - Q)$
  - Useful with the Montgomery Ladder algorithm to compute  $kP$
  - We represent  $w(P)$  as  $\frac{W_P}{Z}$  and  $w(Q)$  as  $\frac{W_Q}{Z}$
  - 5 multiplications, 4 squares, 1 multiplication by  $d$

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**Algorithm 2**  $w$ -coordinates Adding and Doubling revisited with the Co-Z trick.

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**Require:**  $W_2, W_3, Z, \frac{1}{w_1}$

- 1:  $C \leftarrow (W_2 + W_3)^2$
- 2:  $D \leftarrow Z^2$
- 3:  $E \leftarrow \frac{1}{w_1} C$
- 4:  $U \leftarrow E + C$
- 5:  $V \leftarrow E + D$
- 6:  $S \leftarrow (W_2(Z + W_2))^2$
- 7:  $T \leftarrow S + dD^2$
- 8:  $W_4 \leftarrow UT$
- 9:  $W_5 \leftarrow VS$
- 10:  $Z' \leftarrow VT$
- 11: **return**  $W_4, W_5, Z'$

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**Algorithm 3** Montgomery Ladder

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**Require:**  $w(P), k = (k_{t-1}, \dots, k_0)_2$

- 1:  $R_0 \leftarrow O$
- 2:  $R_1 \leftarrow P$
- 3: **for**  $j = t - 1$  **to** 0 **do**
- 4:     **if**  $k_j = 0$  **then**
- 5:          $R_1 \leftarrow R_0 + R_1$
- 6:          $R_0 \leftarrow 2R_0$
- 7:     **else**
- 8:          $R_0 \leftarrow R_0 + R_1$
- 9:          $R_1 \leftarrow 2R_1$
- 10:    **end if**
- 11: **end for**
- 12: **return**  $R_0 = w(kP), R_1 = w(kP + P)$

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- **Main requirements :**
  - Number of points :  $|E| = 2^c p$ , with  $c$  small and  $p$  a large prime
  - Number of points on the Twist : we have the same requirement
  
- **Secondary requirements :**
  - $j$ -invariant :  $1/d^8$  shall generate  $GF(2^m)$
  - Avoiding small discriminant :  $\Delta_E = Tr(E)^2 - 4q$  where  $q = 2^m$  shall be divisible by a large prime
  - Avoiding pairing attack : the embedding degree of the curve shall be large, greater than  $\frac{p-1}{100}$

Secu.	Name	Modulus	Parameter d	Generator
112	BEC223	$x^{223} + x^{159} + 1$	$t^{64} + t^{36} + t^5 + 1$	
128	BEC257	$x^{257} + x^{65} + 1$	$t^{65} + t^{31} + t^{14} + 1$	
156	BEC313	$x^{313} + x^{121} + 1$	$t^{38} + t^{33} + t^{28} + 1$	
215	BEC431	$x^{431} + x^{303} + x^{239} + x^{111} + 1$	$t^{83} + t^{66} + t^{17} + 1$	
239	BEC479	$x^{479} + x^{255} + 1$	$t^{73} + t^{29} + t^3 + 1$	
243	BEC487	$x^{487} + x^{295} + x^{167} + x^{39} + 1$	$t^{69} + t^{33} + t^{15} + 1$	
260	BEC521	$x^{521} + x^{489} + 1$	$t^{66} + t^{29} + t^{28} + 1$	
284	BEC569	$x^{569} + x^{441} + x^{313} + x^{121} + 1$	$t^{56} + t^{45} + t^{41} + 1$	

- 49 new curves
- 3 months of computing over a cluster of 80 cores
- Selection rate : 0,001%

- Each step of the Montgomery Ladder, we have a multiplication by  $1/w_1$  where  $w_1 = w(G)$ ,  $G$  the point generator
- We can choose a generator with a small inverse  $w$  representation
- Re-write the BEC equation with  $w$  :
  - $d(w + w^2) = x^4 + (1 + w + w^2)x^2 + (w + w^2)x$
- We save 20% of the computation time of the Montgomery Ladder

# NEW ELLIPTIC CURVES

Secu.	Name	Modulus	Parameter d	Generator
112	BEC223	$x^{223} + x^{159} + 1$	$t^{64} + t^{36} + t^5 + 1$	$t^{32} + 1$
128	BEC257	$x^{257} + x^{65} + 1$	$t^{65} + t^{31} + t^{14} + 1$	$t^{192}$
156	BEC313	$x^{313} + x^{121} + 1$	$t^{38} + t^{33} + t^{28} + 1$	$t^{64} + 1$
215	BEC431	$x^{431} + x^{303} + x^{239} + x^{111} + 1$	$t^{83} + t^{66} + t^{17} + 1$	$t^{64} + 1$
239	BEC479	$x^{479} + x^{255} + 1$	$t^{73} + t^{29} + t^3 + 1$	$t^{64} + 1$
243	BEC487	$x^{487} + x^{295} + x^{167} + x^{39} + 1$	$t^{69} + t^{33} + t^{15} + 1$	$t^{64} + 1$
260	BEC521	$x^{521} + x^{489} + 1$	$t^{66} + t^{29} + t^{28} + 1$	$t^{32} + 1$
284	BEC569	$x^{569} + x^{441} + x^{313} + x^{121} + 1$	$t^{56} + t^{45} + t^{41} + 1$	$t^{64} + 1$

# BEC AND PHYSICAL ATTACKS

Physical Attacks	Intrinsic Resistance		Remaining Vulnerability
	Due to choice of parameters of BEC	Due to implementation done	Additional countermeasure
Timing Attacks	Unified arithmetics	Montgomery Ladder/Constant time programming	-
SPA			
CPA/DPA	-	-	Randomization of coordinates
Template Attack			
Relative doubling Attack	-	-	Blinded scalar
RPA/ZPA	W-coordinates arithmetics	Direct implementation of the generator	-
Carry-based Attack	Binary curves chosen	-	-
Horizontal Attack	-	-	Attack model to be tested
Safe error	-	Montgomery Ladder	-
Invalid point analysis	-	-	Verify that point is on the curve
Invalid curve analysis	Curves' parameters on Twist for eg	Direct implementation of curve parameter	-
Twist Attack	Curves' parameter for Twist	-	-
DFA	-	-	Blinded scalar



- RISC V at 100MHz
- Cortex M3 at 96MHz
- **Bec Library**
  - W-coordinate
  - Montgomery Ladder
- **MbedTLS**
  - Jacobian coordinates
  - Sliding window (w=7)

Security Level	Curves	RISV V	Cortex M3
86	<b>P192</b>	-	<b>66 ms</b>
112	BEC223	32 ms	-
	<b>P224</b>	-	<b>85 ms</b>
128	BEC257	46 ms	-
	<b>Ed25519</b>	-	<b>94 ms</b>
	<b>P256</b>	-	<b>122 ms</b>
151	BEC313	79 ms	-
192	<b>P384</b>	-	<b>202 ms</b>
215	BEC431	188 ms	-
240	BEC479	242 ms	-
	BEC487	264 ms	-
256	<b>P512</b>	-	<b>351 ms</b>
	BEC521	316 ms	-
284	BEC569	396 ms	-

- **New set of Binary Edwards Curves**
  - Check all security requirements
  - Optimized for 32 bits architectures
  - Secure against a set of physical attacks
  
- **With great performances**
  
- **Works in progress :**
  - Check the physical security
  - Complete integration in ECC protocols (ECDH, ECDSA, EdDSA)

Thanks for your attention

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