|Stéphanie Delaune (IRISA - CNRS)|
Date de l'exposé : 17 mars 2017
A method for verifying privacy-type properties: the unbounded case
We consider the problem of verifying anonymity and unlinkability in the symbolic model, where protocols are represented as processes in a variant of the applied pi calculus notably used in the Proverif tool. Existing tools and techniques do not allow one to verify directly these properties, expressed as behavioral equivalences. We propose a different approach: we design two conditions on protocols which are sufficient to ensure anonymity and unlinkability, and which can then be effectively checked automatically using Proverif. Our two conditions correspond to two broad classes of attacks on unlinkability, corresponding to data and control-flow leaks. This theoretical result is general enough to apply to a wide class of protocols.
This is a joint work with D. Baelde and L. Hirschi (S&P 2016).