

Calculational Design of Information Flow Monitors

Mounir Assaf David Naumann

Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ


November 9th, 2016

SoSySec Seminar, Rennes




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- Information security :
 - Confidentiality
 - Integrity
 - Availability
- Traditionally, dissemination of information is prevented through Access control :
 - Deals with what piece of information can be accessed? by whom?
 - Yet, is this piece of information handled correctly when accessed?
- Information Flow Control :
 - Tracks how information is propagated through a program
 - Verifies that **information flows** are secure with respect to a security policy




Implicit flows

- from **conditional** expressions to variables assigned inside conditionals
- **An implicit flow** from variable `secret` to variable `public`
 - Detected by [Volpano et al.,96], [Amtoft & Banerjee,04], [Hunt & Sands,06], [Jif], [Flow Caml], [Le Guernic et al.,06] ...



- **No information flow** from variable `secret` to variable `y`
 - Static analysis by abstract interpretation of self-composed programs [Kovács et al.,13], [Müller et al.,15]



- **No information flow** from variable `secret` to variable `y`
- **No information flow** from variable `secret` to variable `public`
 - Hybrid monitoring by relying on complex static analyses of non-executed branches [Besson et al.,13], [Besson et al.,16]


- How do we account for information leaks, without rejecting too many secure programs?
 - More reasoning on program semantics?
Abstract interpretation!

- This talk : **Monitoring information flow** as **calculational abstract interpretation**

Follow up on monitoring as abstract interpretation [Chudnov et al.,14]

- Systematic design and derivation of information flow monitors
- Leveraging a large body of the literature in abstract interpretation, since seminal papers [Cousots,77 & 79]
- Semantic characterization of information flow monitors as a starting point


- Termination-Insensitive Non-Interference:



- A pre/post relational logic formulation: [Benton,04]
For any two input memories, agreement over “Public inputs” leads to agreement over “Public outputs” for the output memories

assume $\Delta Public_{input}$; c ; **assert** $\Delta Public_{output}$

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```
assume  $\Delta$ public;
```

```
  c;
```

```
assert  $\Delta$ outputs
```

Major execution

*public*¹*secret*¹⁰

assume Δ public;

c;

assert Δ outputs

Major execution**Minor executions** $public^1 secret^{10}$ $public^1 secret^{20}$ $public^1 secret^{30}$ $public^0 secret^{11}$ $public^3 secret^{10}$

...

`assume Δ public;``c;``assert Δ outputs`

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assume $\Delta public;$

|



...


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
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
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
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
Major execution**Minor executions**

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- Monitor either returns result of major execution, or withholds result if **assert** command fails ⚡

- **Ideal monitor:** a simultaneous execution of the program on a major state, and a **tracking set** (all – relevant – minor states)

$$\llbracket c \rrbracket \in \text{States} \rightarrow \text{States}, \quad \llbracket c \rrbracket_{\sigma} \in \mathcal{P}(\text{States}) \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(\text{States})$$



- Pick an abstraction \mathcal{A}
- Give abstract objects $a \in \mathcal{A}$ a meaning by linking them to concrete objects $c \in \mathcal{C}$ through a Galois connection:

$$(\mathcal{C}, \sqsubseteq) \begin{array}{c} \xleftarrow{\gamma} \\ \xrightarrow{\alpha} \end{array} (\mathcal{A}, \sqsubseteq^\#)$$
- Best approximation of a transformer $f \in \mathcal{C} \rightarrow \mathcal{C}$ given by :

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Let \mathcal{C} to be a powerset of reachable states, and \mathcal{A} be a powerset of parity predicates on variables:

$$= \gamma(\text{Even } y) \\ \{ \sigma \in \text{States} \mid \sigma(y) \text{ is even} \}$$

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
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
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 &= \{ \text{Even } y, \text{Odd } x \}
 \end{aligned}$$

- Assuming a Galois connection: $(\mathcal{P}(\text{States}), \subseteq) \xleftrightarrow[\alpha]{\gamma} (\mathcal{A}, \sqsubseteq^\#)$
- Best approximation of static collecting semantics $\{c\} \in \mathcal{P}(\text{States}) \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(\text{States})$ given by : $\alpha \circ \{c\} \circ \gamma$




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



- Pick an abstraction: **relational formulas**
- Define a Galois connection interpreting relational formula:
Monitoring wrt. a major state means that the abstraction should be interpreted wrt. a major state $\sigma \in \text{States}$:

$$\gamma_{\sigma}(\mathbb{A}x) \triangleq \{\tau \in \text{States} \mid \tau(x) = \sigma(x)\}$$

$$\alpha_{\sigma}(\Sigma) \triangleq \{\Phi \mid \forall \tau \in \Sigma, \tau \mid \sigma \models \Phi\}$$








- Galois connections indexed by major states $\sigma \in \text{States}$

$$(\mathcal{P}(\text{States}), \subseteq) \xleftrightarrow[\alpha_\sigma]{\gamma_\sigma} (\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{L}), \sqsubseteq^\#)$$


$\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{L})$: sets of relational formulas interpreted conjunctively



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
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
Let $\sigma' = \llbracket \text{if } b \text{ then } c_1 \text{ else } c_2 \rrbracket \sigma$ and observe:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \alpha_{\sigma'} \circ (\text{if } b \text{ then } c_1 \text{ else } c_2)_\sigma \circ \gamma_\sigma \\
 = & \quad \text{consider case } \llbracket b \rrbracket \sigma = 1, \text{ so } \sigma' = \llbracket c_1 \rrbracket \sigma \\
 & \alpha_{\sigma'} \circ ((c_1)_\sigma \circ \text{grd}_\sigma^b \circ \gamma_\sigma \sqcup \{c_2\} \circ \text{grd}^{-b} \circ \gamma_\sigma) \\
 = & \quad \text{Galois: } \alpha \text{ preserve joins} \\
 & \alpha_{\sigma'} \circ (c_1)_\sigma \circ \text{grd}_\sigma^b \circ \gamma_\sigma \sqcup^\# \alpha_{\sigma'} \circ \{c_2\} \circ \text{grd}^{-b} \circ \gamma_\sigma \\
 \sqsubseteq^\# & \quad \text{Galois: } id \sqsubseteq^\# \gamma_\sigma \circ \alpha_\sigma \\
 & \alpha_{\sigma'} \circ (c_1)_\sigma \circ \gamma_\sigma \circ \alpha_\sigma \circ \text{grd}_\sigma^b \circ \gamma_\sigma \\
 & \quad \sqcup^\# \alpha_{\sigma'} \circ \{c_2\} \circ \gamma_\sigma \circ \alpha_\sigma \circ \text{grd}^{-b} \circ \gamma_\sigma \\
 \sqsubseteq^\# & \quad \text{by ind hyp: } \alpha_{\sigma'} \circ (c_1)_\sigma \circ \gamma_\sigma \sqsubseteq^\# (c_1)_\sigma^\# \\
 & (c_1)_\sigma^\# \circ \alpha_\sigma \circ \text{grd}_\sigma^b \circ \gamma_\sigma \\
 & \quad \sqcup^\# \alpha_{\sigma'} \circ \{c_2\} \circ \gamma_\sigma \circ \alpha_\sigma \circ \text{grd}^{-b} \circ \gamma_\sigma \\
 \sqsubseteq^\# & \quad \text{posit a sound static analysis: } \alpha_{\sigma'} \circ \{c_2\} \circ \gamma_\sigma \sqsubseteq^\# \{c_2\}^\# \\
 & (c_1)_\sigma^\# \circ \alpha_\sigma \circ \text{grd}_\sigma^b \circ \gamma_\sigma \sqcup^\# \{c_2\}^\# \circ \alpha_\sigma \circ \text{grd}^{-b} \circ \gamma_\sigma
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
- A specification from which a tractable monitor is derived through the calculational framework of abstract interpretation [Cousots, 77, 79 & 99]

$$\alpha_{\sigma'} \circ (c)_\sigma \circ \gamma_\sigma \sqsubseteq^\# (c)_\sigma^\#$$


- Structural induction, standard derivation for most commands
- Design choices for the static part of the monitor in the case of “high branches”:
 - Always top: simulating a purely dynamic monitor forgetting all formulas [Besson et al.,13]
 - Modified variables: forgetting relational formulas that may be falsified [Le Guernic et al.,07] [Russo & Sabelfeld,10]
 - Interval analysis: inferring new relational formulas by leveraging actual values



- **Interval analysis of non-executed branch** determines that:
 - variable `public` is equal to `true`
 - variable `y` is incremented by 1
- **Comparison with major state** after conditional determines :
 - all minor states agree with the major state on the value of both variables `public` and `y`
 - Formalised through a reduced product [Cousots, 79], providing an interface between relational formulas and intervals




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


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
$secret^{100} public^1 y^5,$




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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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




Future work

- Exploring more systematically the design space of information flow monitors
 - Better precision, more subtle policies, richer languages, less overhead . . .


$$\rho_0^\# = \{\Delta, \text{Mod}, \text{Interval}, \text{Polyhedra}, \text{Symbolic}\}$$



$$\text{reduce}(\rho_1^{\#'} \sqcup^\# \rho_2^{\#'})$$

- Trade-off performance and precision during the monitoring process


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
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
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
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[arxiv.org/abs/1608.01654, to appear'17]



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Questions? :)